AnalPhilosopher

I'm a conservative. I'm also a proponent of animal rights. I won't say I'm a proponent of animal rights because I'm a conservative, the way Peter Singer says he's a vegetarian because he's a utilitarian, because that would imply a logical connection between them. I don't think there's any logical connection between conservatism and animal rights, or indeed between any political morality and animal rights. But they're not incompatible, either. One can be a conservative and a proponent of animal rights or a conservative and an opponent of animal rights. That there are more of the latter than of the former is an accident.

Let me explain what I mean by "proponent of animal rights." Animals matter. Morally. They have intrinsic moral significance, just like human beings (but unlike plants). Immanuel Kant famously denied that animals have intrinsic moral significance. If it's wrong to treat animals in certain ways, he held, it's not because the animal is wronged but because some human being who takes an interest in the animal is wronged. Utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham say that it's not rational agency that confers moral status on a being; it's the capacity to suffer, and animals have the capacity to suffer.

I'm not a utilitarian, but I'm not a Kantian, either. I'm a nonKantian deontologist who believes that it's wrong to harm others. Animals can be harmed. Their lives are valuable to them in the same way that your life is valuable to you. Why is it wrong for me to kill you? I suspect you will say that my killing you deprives you of your future, which contains enjoyments, experiences, projects, and activities. Animals such as dogs, cows, pigs, and chickens are capable of enjoyments, experiences, and activities, too, although perhaps not of having projects. If animals can suffer the same sorts of loss that you can, then if that loss makes it wrong to kill you, why doesn't it make it wrong to kill an animal?

Why should my conservatism be thought to deny any of this? It might be said that conservatism is committed to conserving traditions, and that it's traditional to treat animals as resources for human use. But no conservative endorses all tradition. Slavery is traditional. No conservative defends slavery. There must be a criterion for distinguishing between those traditions that are worth preserving and those that are not. I suggest that the criterion involves harm to others. Slavery harmed slaves. That is why it need not and should not be conserved. But using animals for food and other purposes (entertainment, for example) harms them. That it's traditional to so use them is therefore irrelevant. Bad traditions should be abolished, not conserved.

I've only sketched my argument. The main point of this post is that there is no logical incompatibility between being a conservative and being a proponent of animal rights. If there is, then I'm horribly confused.

I found this site by accident. Note that the site owner builds models of drawings by M. C. Escher, who is one of my favorite artists.

To the Editor:

The nuclear crisis in Iran is just the current example of a global nonproliferation regime held together with chicken wire and hope. As the regime crumbles, we can expect other countries to move up the crisis list, each bringing fresh opportunities for pre-emptive military action.

We can't bomb our way out of proliferation. But in a world where nuclear weapons are the badge of real nations, no self-respecting superpower is going to disarm unilaterally and every nonnuclear state will want a seat at the table.

The only way to escape this deadly cycle is for the nuclear powers to step up and lead negotiations for an international agreement for the total abolition of nuclear weapons.

For years, Iran has signaled its willingness to back off nuclear weapons if everyone else does. Why not accept this offer?

Chris Cooper
New York, Jan. 27, 2005
The writer is a spokesman for AbolitionNow.org, a nuclear disarmament coalition.

Here, for those who want to see what I looked like as a child, is an image from about 1960. The man is my paternal great-grandfather, Thomas Jefferson Jackson (1881-1963). The woman is my paternal grandmother (Tom's daughter), Margaret Jane Jackson (1911-1967). The taller boy is my brother Glenn (born 1955). I'm the shorter boy (born 1957).

The liberal view of abortion is advanced chiefly by the women's movement in the democracies of the West, although one need not be a feminist in order to espouse it. Of the two features that render the abortion conflict particularly perplexing, the liberal view addresses only the special nature of the fetus. The claim that is the heart of this view, and on which all of its further components depend, is that a fetus is not the kind of entity whose rights or interests are properly taken into consideration in determining the morality of abortion. Although abortion results in the death of the fetus, it does no harm or injury because the fetus is not the sort of thing that can be harmed or injured. Abortion therefore lacks a victim. In the liberal's opinion the appearance of interpersonal conflict in the case of abortion is an illusion. The only party whose rights or interests are at stake is the pregnant woman; because the fetus is granted no standing in the question, there can be no genuine conflict. As long as an abortion is consented to and carried out competently, then it is a private matter between a woman and her physician. There is simply no issue concerning the moral status of abortion—or at any rate no issue that does not equally arise for all other surgical procedures.

On the liberal view abortion is morally on a par with appendectomy. If this is so, there is no ground for state regulation of abortion that is not also a ground for state regulation of appendectomy. Any law that stipulates permissible grounds for performing abortions, or that prohibits their performance altogether, is an unwarranted invasion of the contractual relationship between a woman and her physician. For abortion, the only permissible policy is a permissive policy.

(L. W. Sumner, Abortion and Moral Theory [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981], 15)

Compulsion, n. The eloquence of power.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Certain expressions that are not themselves objectionable annoy as a result of overuse. One of them is "Kudos to," as in "Kudos to President Bush for bringing democracy to Iraq" or "Kudos to the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences for ignoring Fahrenheit 9/11." The word is Greek, meaning "glory," but the best synonyms are "praise" and "honor." I see the word nearly every day in The Dallas Morning News, either in a letter to the editor or in an editorial opinion. Can we please vary the usage, people?

My friend Peg Kaplan sent a link to this. Peg should not be assumed to agree with its contents.

To the Editor:

Our food habits could not be more dysfunctional. Food makers lobbying to edit national dietary standards is the tip of the iceberg.

Deciding what we grow and eat is now answered by large agribusinesses here and overseas, farm subsidies, chemical companies, genetic engineers and lobbyists.

The quickest change comes from our buying dollars.

Melanie Cheng
San Francisco, Jan. 26, 2005

Impiety, n. Your irreverence toward my deity.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

See here for a famous philosophical limerick.

Many problems would be solved, and much controversy averted, if people would simply do their jobs. If you're a teacher, teach. Don't indoctrinate. If you're a judge, apply the law. Don't make it up to suit your inclinations. If you're a scientist, stay within the confines of your discipline. Don't expound on matters outside your ken. If you're a journalist, report the news. Don't interject your opinions about the events you cover.

Every job, from teacher to reporter, comes with various rights and responsibilities. One cannot, while claiming to do one's job, enjoy its rights without assuming its responsibilities. I'm not suggesting that everyone work to rule (working to rule, for those who don't know, means doing your job and nothing more than your job), for each of us ought to be encouraged to do more than is strictly required by our job descriptions. In other words, each of us should be encouraged to perform supererogatory actions. Professors may be expected to have only three office hours per week. It would be praiseworthy, although not strictly required, for a professor to have four, five, or six office hours.

What I'm suggesting is not that one work to rule but that one not combine jobs or try to do other people's jobs. That leads to trouble. If you enjoy persuading people and can't help but do it, you should not go into teaching, for that is not part of the teacher's role. If you have moral convictions that you feel cannot be compromised, don't become a judge, for judges must keep their moral convictions out of their rulings. You may think that a particular statute is wrongheaded, but you must apply it conscientiously to the case at hand. If you want to be a political player, don't go into journalism, for journalists are spectators, not players. Go into politics.

Does anyone else sense that the line between playing a game and watching it—between participation and observation—is being blurred? Look at fans at major sporting events. They try to influence play on the field or court. Nobody is content any longer to stay out of the fray.

Someone might agree with what I've said to this point but disagree about what I'm about to say. My sense, acquired over a long period of time, is that liberals (I used to be one) have a more difficult time doing their job than conservatives do. Liberal judges are not content merely to interpret and apply the law. They want to shape it. Ronald Dworkin argues that constitutional law is nothing more (or less) than moral theorizing. Judges are philosopher kings! Liberal reporters could not resist the temptation to try to influence the recent presidential election. Day after day, news stories in The New York Times and other newspapers were biased against President Bush and in favor of John Kerry. Liberal scientists (both natural and social) take positions on matters of public policy, thinking—falsely!—that their expertise in the realm of fact gives them expertise in the realm of value. Liberal philosophers think that their training in analysis, argumentation, and criticism gives extra weight to their values, which of course it does not. I could go on, but you get the idea.

What do all of these cases have in common? The answer is: a captive audience. Students are in class to be taught. A teacher may view them as a captive audience for moralizing or preaching. Reporters have readers who expect to be informed. A reporter may try to influence them by using emotive language or by emphasizing certain events rather than others. (Bias, to be effective, cannot be obvious.) Scientists such as Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins have avid followers who enjoy their popularizations of science. They abuse their readers (violate their trust) by interjecting political and moral bias into their discussions. See here.

I'm not saying that only liberals blur boundaries, but they do, it seems to me, have more trouble staying within the confines of their job descriptions than conservatives do. Why that should be is an interesting question, one that I may take up on another occasion.

1-29-85 What a raving libertarian I was five years ago! It is hard to believe how much I have changed in that short period of time. Instead of viewing government as the villain, as I once did, I now view it as the savior—the savior of justice and morality. Through government, we can insure [sic; should be "ensure"] that people have enough food to eat, enough clothing to wear, and enough shelter and fuel to survive through the cold months. These are basic needs, and justice requires that they be met by the state—the community as a whole—if they are not met through private exchange. The Keith of five years ago was cold, cruel, and cynical. The present Keith, in contrast, is sensitive and caring.

R. M. Hare died on this date three years ago, at the age of 82. He was one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century. I am privileged to have been able to correspond with him. Once, I asked him whether he was a Christian. He said he was, but that he rejected the supernatural part of Christianity. In other words, he did not believe in God and he did not believe in an afterlife. He was a Christian in the sense that he subscribed to Jesus's moral teachings. I believe this was precisely the position of Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), who, as many of you know, excised certain portions of the Bible to produce what is known as The Jefferson Bible. See here for Hare's philosophical autobiography. See here for my bibliography of Hare's writings.

Jesse Ashdown, "Don't Let the Millennium Bug Bite: Should New York Reinstate Sovereign Immunity for the Year 2000 Computer Glitch?" Albany Law Review 62 (1998): 293.

Heather Noelle Duffey, "Attention All Child Stealers—Oregon Welcomes You: State ex rel. Johnson v. Bail, 938 P.2d 209 (Or. 1997) (en banc)," University of Dayton Law Review 23 (spring 1998): 623.

Kelly D. Hine, "Vigilantism Revisited: An Economic Analysis of the Law of Extra-Judicial Self-Help or Why Can't Dick Shoot Henry for Stealing Jane's Truck?" The American University Law Review 47 (June 1998): 1221.

Kevin H. Smith, "How to Become a Law Professor Without Really Trying: A Critical, Heuristic, Deconstructionist, and Hermeneutical Exploration of Avoiding the Drudgery Associated with Actually Working as an Attorney," University of Kansas Law Review 47 (November 1998): 139.

A. Mechele Dickerson, "To Love, Honor, and (Oh!) Pay: Should Spouses Be Forced to Pay Each Other's Debts?" Boston University Law Review 78 (October 1998): 961.

If you get a chance, watch Saturday Night Live tonight. The musical guest is Scissor Sisters. Tonight's episode is a rerun. When I saw the original a few weeks ago, I didn't know what to make of the band. The male singer sings in a high-pitched voice, wears feminine clothing and boots, and struts about the stage. He has dance moves I've never seen before. This band may take the world by storm. The singer may become the new Elvis. Be sure to watch both songs. One comes early in the program, the other late.

To the Editor:

Re "Two Views of Democracy for Iraqi Voters: Bullets and Ballots" (front page, Jan. 28):

On Sunday, Iraq will hold its first elections since the United States invasion. While the legitimacy of the elections has been questioned even in the mainstream press, one ethical question calls for greater attention.

President Bush has called for the Iraqi people to "defy" the insurgency despite the fact that many Iraqis will certainly die if they vote. Much of Iraq is out of control, including most of Baghdad.

The United States military controls only a very small part of Iraq. We ought to acknowledge that the United States, as occupier, owes the Iraqi people security before asking them to risk their lives.

Mr. Bush wants the Iraqis to vote, not because it is the right time for them, or the best thing for Iraq, but because the failure or postponement of elections would be an embarrassment for him.

Iraqis will die on Sunday, for an election intended primarily to save the president from further embarrassment.

Thomas E. Noerper
Minneapolis, Jan. 28, 2005

See here for my discussion of this common saying.

Police, n. An armed force for protection and participation.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Nothing says "Texas" as much as the longhorn. See here. The University of Texas at Austin athletic teams are known as the Longhorns. I see longhorns from time to time during my bike rallies.

To the Editor:

In "Winning Cases, Losing Voters" (Op-Ed, Jan. 26), Paul Starr presents the Democratic Party with the Hobbesian choice of living by its convictions or compromising its principles in order to get more votes.

But the choice is not that bleak. Senator John Kerry did get more than 50 million votes. It is as reasonable to suggest that a more unequivocal stand on the war in Iraq would have gotten him more votes as it is to assume that he lost votes because of his perceived lack of sufficient "moral values." Democrats who would abandon their core convictions to convince more voters that they have "gotten religion" would rightly be perceived as weak and hypocritical, and would probably lose anyway.

Perhaps what the party needs is candidates who, like Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy, articulate their beliefs with conviction. The message is good. What we need are better messengers.

John A. Viteritti
Southold, N.Y., Jan. 26, 2005

Note from AnalPhilosopher: It's "Hobson's choice," not "Hobbesian choice." What an idiot.

Any philosopher will tell you that there can be more than one rationale (justification) for a given action or policy. An act of promise-keeping, for example, can be justified on both consequentialist and deontological grounds—because of the kind of act it is and because of its consequences. So why does Paul Krugman consider it morally problematic for President Bush to have—and assert—more than one rationale for Social Security reform? See here. There are many reasons to reform Social Security. Why should President Bush pick just one of them? Don't let Krugman hoodwink you. If there are five reasons to reform Social Security, then President Bush should emphasize all five. There is nothing whatsoever disreputable about this. Indeed, he would be a bad arguer if he ignored good arguments in support of his conclusion.

Epicure, n. An opponent of Epicurus, an abstemious philosopher who, holding that pleasure should be the chief aim of man, wasted no time in gratification of the senses.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Consequentialism is a superset of utilitarianism. It is the doctrine, to put it crudely, that the right thing to do, for anyone, at any time, in any situation, is to maximize the overall good (i.e., to bring about the best overall consequences, where no interests, even those of nonhuman animals, are either disregarded or discounted). Here is Samuel Scheffler's formulation:

Among ethical theories, those that I call 'act-consequentialist' may be characterized roughly as follows. Such theories first specify some principle for ranking overall states of affairs from best to worst from an impersonal point of view. In other words, the rankings generated by the designated principle are not agent-relative; they do not vary from person to person, depending on what one's particular situation is. For they do not embody judgements about which overall states of affairs are best for particular individuals, but rather judgements about which states of affairs are best, all things considered, from an impartial standpoint. After giving some principle for generating such rankings, act-consequentialists then require that each agent in all cases act in such a way as to produce the highest-ranked state of affairs that he is in a position to produce. (Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions, rev. ed. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994], 1 [footnote omitted] [first edition published in 1982])

Kagan (consequentialism): No ACRs; no ACP.
Scheffler (hybrid theory): No ACRs; ACP.
Commonsense morality: ACRs; nonmaximal ACP.
KBJ (deontological egoism): ACRs; maximal ACP.

Admittedly utilitarianism does have consequences which are incompatible with the common moral consciousness, but I tended to take the view "so much the worse for the common moral consciousness". That is, I was inclined to reject the common methodology of testing general ethical principles by seeing how they square with our feelings in particular instances. (J. J. C. Smart, "An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics," in Utilitarianism: For and Against, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973], 1-74, at 68)

1-27-85 I had an interesting question for Bob Schopp the other day. I asked him if [sic; should be "whether"] there was anything strange or unusual about publishing an article the thesis of which one does not accept, or has doubts about. My "bad-samaritan" paper is of just that sort (I am assuming, of course, that the paper will be published). In the paper, I argue for criminal sanctions for bad samaritans; but I'm not sure that I would like to impose such sanctions. Basically, I wanted to see if [sic] I could make a good argument on behalf [sic; should be "in favor"] of bad-samaritan laws, and I think that I did. But I disagree with one of the argument's premises—namely, that moral perfectionism constitutes a legitimate reason for infringing liberty. The argument, however, is valid, and a given person might take it up and use it as the basis for enacting bad-samaritan laws. Is that odd? Bob didn't think so. He said that after a series of articles, or a book, which states and defends a particular proposition, one might get a reputation in the field; but one article ought not to create such a reputation. That relieved me. I may one day be known as a liberal, and I don't want my past to come back to haunt me.

An oxymoron is a contradiction in terms. A pleonasm is a redundancy. The other day, a blurb in the sports section of The Dallas Morning News said that University of Pittsburgh basketball player Yuri Demetris was arrested for burglary and simple assault. He is accused of "entering a former girlfriend's apartment twice through a bedroom window and hitting her with a closed fist." That's pleonastic. Either he hit her with a closed hand or he hit her with a fist.

Conservatism refers both to men's attachment to the customs and institutions which have long surrounded them and to the doctrines by which such an attachment is explained and defended. No attitude has been more common in human history. Change has generally been regarded with suspicion, and innovators have frequently been forced into the position of insisting that they merely seek to restore what has been temporarily lost. Under these conditions, laws are not "made," but must be declared by the ruler, sometimes after they have been coaxed from some divine source. Conservatism is therefore the preference for what has grown up over a long period of time in contrast to what has been made by deliberate human contrivance.

(Kenneth Minogue, "Conservatism," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards [New York: Macmillan Publishing Company & The Free Press, 1967], 2:195-8, at 195)

Thanks, Peg, for reminding us. Forgetting is easy. Remembering is hard.

Magic, n. An art of converting superstition into coin. There are other arts serving the same high purpose, but the discreet lexicographer does not name them.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

To the Editor:

Re "At Harvard, the Bigger Concern of the Faculty Is the President's Management Style" (Education page, Jan. 26):

There are many faculty members at Harvard who are not "concerned" about the management style of Lawrence H. Summers, the university's president, but who rather strongly support his leadership of our university, and for two basic reasons.

First, his substantive decisions strike us as good (notably, his expansion of the campus and his plans to invest significantly in the sciences).

Second, Mr. Summers's statements about issues of concern at the university seem to us intelligent and honest.

But we do have a criticism of Mr. Summers: that he apologizes for perceived political incorrectness. At universities, of all places, the ability to speak freely needs to be preserved.

Steven Shavell
Professor of Law and Economics
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, Mass.
Jan. 26, 2005

One of my Ethics students (who will go unnamed) began a sentence today with "I was taught that." When he finished, I went back to it, for it seemed worthy of discussion in its own right. Does having been taught something have any normative weight? Suppose I grew up in a family of ax-murderers, I said. How would you react if I said, "I was taught that one should sharpen an ax before using it to murder someone," or "I was taught that one is obligated to murder at least one person a month"? You would say that my having been taught it, however solemnly, cuts no normative ice, and you would be right. Whether what we are taught is worthy of perpetuation is the question; that we were taught it is irrelevant. At the very most, there is a presumption that what we were taught is worthy of perpetuation, but it seems to me to be a weak presumption, easily overridden.

Things are hopping over at The Conservative Philosopher. Lots of links by others; lots of visits; lots of philosophers asking to join the blog. I had no idea there were so many conservative philosophers! I'm glad there are. Liberals have dominated the discussion for too long. Their argumentative muscles have atrophied.

Here is an essay on Americanism by David Gelernter.

Dogs. Yes, dogs. I love dogs. They are loyal to a fault; they are playful and enthusiastic; their love for their human companions is unbounded and unconditional; they hold no grudges; they are patient; they appreciate little favors (as well as big ones); and they don't care whether you're a success or a failure in your work or in your love life—as long as you come home to them. Schopenhauer said that he would not want to live in a world without dogs. Neither would I. I have learned as much from my canine companions as I have from certain philosophers I could name. They teach me (by example); they inspire me; they entertain me; they fulfill me.

Nobody should be surprised to learn that the editors of The New York Times have come out in opposition to Alberto Gonzales as Attorney General. See here. If you read the opinion carefully, you'll see that the only reason for opposition is that Gonzales took positions as an attorney that the Times doesn't like. No evidence is presented that Gonzales is anything less than a superb attorney. Does the Times evaluate all attorneys on the basis of which cases they take or which legal arguments they make? Perhaps we should evaluate doctors on the basis of which patients they care for. The Times has become a national laughingstock. Indeed, I'll go further. The Times has become a reliable anti-authority in moral matters. If it opposes a candidate, that's a good sign that the candidate is superbly qualified.

To the Editor:

As a Christian, I do not understand why the teaching of evolution frightens so many fundamentalists.

I believe that God made man. This is a matter of faith: it cannot be proved according to any scientific paradigm. I also believe that natural selection was the means by which man came into existence.

This is science: it is observable and overwhelmingly supported by physical evidence and scientific consensus.

The greatest irony for fundamentalists is their failure to recognize that science and faith, which can forge a powerful partnership to help us understand the world and our place in it, are both gifts from God. This is not frightening; it is liberating.

I invite fundamentalists to peel the stickers off their science books and confidently take a look at what's inside.

John Hickey
Forest Hills, Queens, Jan. 23, 2005

I just put out a plea for help over at The Conservative Philosopher. See here.

Liberty, n. One of Imagination's most precious possessions.

The rising People, hot and out of breath,
Roared round the palace: "Liberty or death!"
"If death will do," the King said, "let me reign;
You'll have, I'm sure, no reason to complain."
Martha Braymance.

Someone just brought this to my attention.

Why someone would think that there could be such a thing as homosexual marriage has puzzled me. It seems obvious that marriage is inherently heterosexual. But in trying to be charitable to those who believe otherwise, I have racked—some would say "wrecked"—my brain. I think I figured it out. There are different conceptions of marriage. To some, it is nothing more (or less) than an emotional bond between two (or more?) people. Since homosexuals can bond, they're capable of marrying. Since marriage is a package of rights and duties, it is valued. To deny homosexuals an opportunity to participate in this valued institution is to treat likes differently, which violates the principle of equality.

The problem with this reasoning is that it rests on an unduly narrow understanding of marriage. Marriage is more than an emotional bond between two or more individuals. It is a procreative union. Society so values its children that it creates an institution that encourages men and women to form lasting bonds. Children need both a mother and a father. They need resources, love, and care over a long period of time. Marriage is a legal structure designed to ensure, or at least increase the likelihood, that children are brought into loving homes with two parents (one of each sex) and ample resources. Specifically, it provides inducements for fathers to stay with their children. Men, you know, have a tendency to stray.

Given this understanding of marriage, which I believe to be widespread (except possibly in academia), there is no parity between heterosexual and homosexual couples. Only the former can procreate. This logical difference, given society's interest in reproducing itself and its institutions, makes a moral difference. It is not unjust to limit marriage to heterosexuals. The burden of persuasion is on those who would tinker with this long-standing institution. To date, I have seen no argument that comes close to carrying this heavy burden.

May we not hence conclude, that the knowledge of the human faculties is but in its infancy?—that we have not yet learned to attend to those operations of the mind, of which we are conscious every hour of our lives?—that there are habits of inattention acquired very early, which are as hard to be overcome as other habits? For I think it is probable, that the novelty of this sensation will procure some attention to it in children at first; but, being in nowise interesting in itself, as soon as it becomes familiar, it is overlooked, and the attention turned solely to that which it signifies. Thus, when one is learning a language, he attends to the sounds; but when he is master of it, he attends only to the sense of what he would express. If this is the case, we must become as little children again, if we will be philosophers; we must overcome this habit of inattention which has been gathering strength ever since we began to think—a habit, the usefulness of which, in common life, atones for the difficulty it creates to the philosopher in discovering the first principles of the human mind.

(Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, in Thomas Reid's Inquiry and Essays, ed. Ronald E. Beanblossom and Keith Lehrer [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983], 1-125, at 39 [essay first published in 1764])

Here is my nephew Jared, who is now almost 23 years old. I haven't seen him in more than 11 years.

It's been only two days since I put out a call for conservative philosophers to join me in a new blogging venture (see here), but already the blog has six members (counting me). Several items have been posted (not all by me) and there have been more than 300 visits to the site. I'm excited! I hope to have at least a dozen members, when all is said and done. Two dozen would be even better. The idea is for someone to post something each day. If more than one item is posted, fine. Please spread the word about this new blog. If you know of someone who satisfies the criteria and might be interested, let me know.

If you care about any of the following, you should abstain from meat:

• animals
• the natural environment
• your health
• humans

To the Editor:

Re "This Is Your Brain on Politics," by Joshua Freedman (Op-Ed, Jan. 18):

The group of political professionals and scientists from U.C.L.A. must have tested the wrong group of Democrats.

There are many of us who voted for John Kerry who believe that we were fighting over the future of our country. Now that George W. Bush has been re-elected, we can expect to see further deterioration in the environment, less money for the inner cities, a continued underfinancing for No Child Left Behind, and a repeated spurning of world opinion.

Indeed, many of us Kerry voters had our eyes on the world, not the World Series.

Evelyn Jackson
South Wellfleet, Mass.
Jan. 20, 2005

This week's link is to KurzweilAI.net.

Pantheism, n. The doctrine that everything is God, in contradistinction to the doctrine that God is everything.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Why couldn't Paul Krugman just write a column about the role of Federal Reserve Chairman and then evaluate the candidates? It would do his readers, most of whom are not economists, a service. No, he has to bash President Bush. See here. Has anyone else come to the conclusion that the man is filled with hate?

Keith:

I too hate editors [see here], but consider this aphorism (from my stepson, a writer):

Great writers are gods;
great editors are atheists.

My new communal blog is up and running. Already there are five members, counting me. I hope to get at least a dozen. There must be some female conservative philosophers out there. If you know of someone who qualifies (see here for the criteria), let me know. So far, I'm the only member to have posted on the new blog, but others will begin soon. Here is my latest post, "What Is Conservatism?" I hope you visit The Conservative Philosopher regularly and spread the word. Please note that the comments function is enabled.

Most people, including most academics, are confusing mixtures. They are moral and immoral, kind and cruel, smart and stupid—yes, academics are often smart and stupid, and this may not be sufficiently recognized by the laity. They are particularly likely to be both smart and stupid in an era of specialization, when academic success is likely to crown not the person of broad general intelligence but rather the person with highly developed intellectual skills in a particular field, and both the field and the skills that conduce to preeminence in it may be bulkheaded from the other fields of thought. The brilliant mathematician, physicist, artist, or historian may be incompetent in dealing with political or economic issues. Einstein's political and economic writings are a case in point. Picasso's artistic, or Sartre's literary and philosophical, or George Bernard Shaw's dramatic genius did not inoculate them against Stalinism, or Heidegger's philosophical genius against Nazism. But if the compartmentalization of competence, and the underlying disunity of the self, are not widely recognized—and they are not—a successful academic may be able to use his success to reach the general public on matters about which he is an idiot. It doesn't help that successful people tend to exaggerate their versatility; abnormal self-confidence is a frequent cause and almost invariable effect of great success.

(Richard A. Posner, Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline [Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2001], 51 [italics in original; footnote omitted])

I don't know where the time went, but it's been 12 years since I brought two-month-old Sophie to my house in Fort Worth. She was born in a horse barn in Red Oak, Texas. I've watched Sophie go from a rampaging puppy to a rambunctious middle-aged dog to an old girl who sleeps a lot, walks more slowly, and doesn't hear as well. But one thing hasn't changed: my love for her. We have been constant companions for a dozen years, with several more to go.

1-24-85 Thursday. I sometimes wonder whether change, in itself, is either good or bad. In particular, I wonder whether change in one's ideological convictions is either good or bad. Here's why I wonder about this. In just five years, I have done an about-face on many issues, such as the desirability of promoting economic efficiency above all else in society and the desirability of maintaining a clean, open environment. Now, I am even rethinking my position on capital punishment. At one time, I was vehemently opposed to capital punishment, but now I think that it may be justified in a narrow range of cases, such as where the defendant has committed multiple murders. Is there something wrong with this flip-flop in my views? Obviously, I think not; otherwise, I wouldn't change them. But many people consider change to be intrinsically bad, as when they criticize Ronald Reagan [1911-2004] or other politicians for switching political parties. There is a feeling that the person is malleable; subject to change on a whim; a ready target for pressure groups intent upon getting their way. This, of course, need not be the case. A person may simply come to reinterpret the data, or draw a different conclusion from experience. In my case, I have been exposed to many more arguments, pro and con, than I was, say, five years ago. I now see the inherent contradictions in libertarian capitalism. And so on I go, trying to develop the most coherent and justifiable moral system possible. Look in on me five years from now: It's hard telling what you'll see in the way of ideological convictions!

I have always been and will always be a fan of the Detroit Tigers, my home-state baseball team. The Tigers gave me two of the greatest moments of my life: World Series victories in 1968 (when I was 11) and in 1984 (when I was 27). Even if the Tigers never win again (perish the thought!), I will die happy. Since August 1989, however, I have been a fan as well of the Texas Rangers, who play just 10 miles from my Fort Worth house. I love the Rangers the way a parent loves adopted children. Recently, I was distressed to learn that the Rangers were pursuing Carlos Delgado, who refused to stand in the dugout when "God Bless America" was played. See here. Today I learned that he will not be signed by the Rangers. Thank goodness! Did the Rangers think he would be acceptable to Texans? Some, perhaps, but not all. Many of us would have boycotted the team. If Delgado thinks this is such a vile country, why is he here enjoying its benefits? Can you say "ingratitude"?

Addendum: Please don't say that I'm trying to deny Delgado his rights. He has every right to express his opposition to the war in Iraq. I, in turn, have every right to refuse to put money in his pocket—and to condemn his revolting ingratitude.

To the Editor:

In "Caught Between Church and State" (Op-Ed, Jan. 19), Susan Jacoby outlines the history of the conflict between science and religious fundamentalists' desire to have creationism and "intelligent design" taught alongside evolution in public schools. Maybe scientists should stop opposing and instead encourage such classroom comparisons.

When Darwinian evolution, with its compelling array of facts from all branches of science and support from nearly every scientist, is laid alongside creationism, creationism, with absolutely no scientific facts to support it and only a handful of scientists, is going to appear simplistic and embarrassingly nonscientific. In fact, it will appear to be just what it is: religion.

Max M. Brown
Sarasota, Fla., Jan. 19, 2005

To the Editor:

Scientists don't explain evolution properly. I believe that's part of the problem; it's why people are so reluctant to accept evolution, so adamant about labeling it "just a theory." That's why school boards are going to ridiculous extremes, like pasting disclaimers on science textbooks and reading statements to student groups saying that evolution is not a fact.

Scientists need to explain that though evolution is a theory, details of it have been adjusted and proven for years, and are continuously tested and proven. They also need to make it clear that believing in evolution doesn't mean that you can't believe in God.

Roni Berenson
Chesterland, Ohio, Jan. 19, 2005

To the Editor:

Two points must be added to Susan Jacoby's discussion of the Christian fundamentalist effort to force creationism into the science curriculum. First, fundamentalists falsely characterize evolution as "just a theory," thus deceiving people who do not know that a theory in science is not a speculation but a model that best fits the available evidence; like all the biological sciences, evolution is not a complete model, but it is evidence-based science.

Second, what evolution threatens is not faith in God but faith in a literalist reading of Genesis; the only reason fundamentalists care about this topic is that their primary faith is not in God but in scriptural inerrancy.

Steven Tiger
Philadelphia, Jan. 19, 2005

Habeas Corpus. A writ by which a man may be taken out of jail when confined for the wrong crime.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Someone wrote to ask what the costs are of a rule that allows homosexuals to "marry." I told him that he had misunderstood my post. I wasn't comparing the costs of these two rules:

1. All and only heterosexuals may marry.
2. Any couple, heterosexual or homosexual, may marry.

3. All and only heterosexuals may marry.
4. All and only those who have or intend to have children may marry.

5. All and only those 21 years of age or older may consume alcohol.
6. All and only the mature may consume alcohol.

The success of Left2Right makes me think that a blog of conservative philosophers would be useful and enjoyable. If I can get four others to join me, I'll set it up. There is no limit to how many members we can have. (Left2Right has more than two dozen.) Here are the criteria for membership:

1. Holder of a Ph.D. or D.Phil. degree in philosophy.
2. Trained in analytic (as opposed to Continental) philosophy.
3. Conservative.

To the Editor:

Re "Mideast Tensions Are Getting Personal on Campus at Columbia" (news article, Jan. 18):

The most serious charge against Prof. Joseph Massad of Columbia is that he violated the academic freedom of one of his students by conditioning class attendance on her willingness to agree with his perspective on controversial events.

According to the student, and at least one other witness, she raised her hand during a discussion of Israel's incursions into the West Bank to point out that Israel often issued warnings to civilians before its bombings. Professor Massad reportedly replied, "If you're going to deny the atrocities being committed against the Palestinian people, then you can get out of my classroom."

If Professor Massad indeed made such a statement, which he denies, then he violated the student's academic freedom to express views contrary to his. Columbia has a duty to determine if this serious accusation is accurate and to take appropriate action if it is.

Alan M. Dershowitz
Cambridge, Mass., Jan. 18, 2005
The writer is a professor at Harvard Law School.

Feminists are convinced that if men and women are different, men will be ranked as superior. Instead of accepting the difference and showing that the claim of superiority doesn't follow from it, they deny difference. It would be funny if it weren't so dangerous. Charles Murray weighs in on the Harvard imbroglio here. It sure would be nice to see liberals come to the defense of science.

Addendum: There's actually a pattern here. If sexual difference might be interpreted as hierarchy, deny sexual difference. If believing that there are different races inclines people to racism, deny the existence of races. If nations go to war, work to destroy nations. If religion generates hatred and violence, destroy religion. Liberals always attack at the wrong point.

I grew up in Michigan, the Great Lake State. It has two peninsulas. The Lower Peninsula is shaped like a mitten. I grew up in the Thumb Area, about 20 miles southeast of Saginaw Bay. See here. Most of my family still lives there.

I just learned (while watching the Steelers-Patriots football game) that Johnny Carson died. He was family. I spent many a night with him, laughing at his antics. I loved his monologues, his skits, and his corny jokes. One day he complained about the heat in Burbank. "How hot was it?" Ed McMahon asked. "It was so hot that I saw a dog chasing a cat, and both were walking." I'm tempted to say that Johnny will be missed, but he's been missed for many years.

Here is my encyclopedia entry on sodomy from a few years ago. The editor changed my wording in a couple of places without my permission. I hate editors.

I hope everyone is having an enjoyable Sunday, as I am. I've been busy around the house: cleaning, cooking, reading the newspaper, and watching the NFL playoffs on my 42-inch plasma television (in high definition!). I ran 3.1 miles in gorgeous weather. I've been tinkering with my department's new blog instead of posting here. I'll post some things later. It's time to eat.

Intention, n. The mind's sense of the prevalence of one set of influences over another set; an effect whose cause is the imminence, immediate or remote, of the performance of an involuntary act.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

To the Editor:

Re "Mad Cow Across the Border" (editorial, some editions, Jan. 19):

Nearly 190,000 animals have been tested for bovine spongiform encephalopathy since June 2004 as part of an intensive Department of Agriculture surveillance program. None have tested positive. Even if additional cases of B.S.E. are discovered in the United States, scientists agree that B.S.E. is not a public health risk.

At least 82 percent of the cattle harvested in the United States are less than 30 months old. Current science says that B.S.E. develops only in cattle older than 30 months. The testing program targets these cattle. Testing all cattle would be like testing children for Alzheimer's disease. It is just not necessary.

As a rancher, a mother and a grandmother, I am confident in the safety of the beef I serve to my own family and to others around the nation.

Jan Lyons
President, National Cattlemen's Beef Association
Manhattan, Kan., Jan. 20, 2005

I keep hearing it said that the rationale for limiting marriage to heterosexuals can't be childrearing, since infertile heterosexual couples are allowed to marry and homosexual couples with children are not. This betrays a misunderstanding of law. Law works by means of rules, and these rules must be workable. Take the drinking age. The point of the drinking age, I think everyone will agree, is to limit alcohol consumption to those who are mature enough to handle it. Why, then, doesn't the law say this? Why doesn't the law say, "All and only the mature may drink"? The answer, which should be obvious, is that it would be unworkable. Maturity is difficult (expensive) to ascertain. But we know that maturity is linked to age, even if imperfectly, so we use age as a surrogate for it. Is this unfair to mature underage people? Perhaps, but this is more than offset by having a workable rule.

The same reasoning applies to marriage. Marriage is an institution designed to encourage childrearing. It provides a bundle of rights and responsibilities that have been shown to be to the advantage of children. The law might stipulate that only couples who have (or intend to have) children may marry, but this, like a rule limiting alcohol consumption to the mature, would be unworkable. So the law does the next best thing: It finds a surrogate. Since only heterosexual couples can procreate, and since sex is easy to ascertain, limiting marriage to heterosexuals serves the law's purpose of promoting childrearing. It's an imperfect rule, admittedly, and it's arguably unfair to those denied its benefits, but the costs of an alternative rule are significant.

There are many, many examples in which the law trades fairness for efficiency. We're not dealing with an ideal world in which there are no information costs; we're dealing with a world in which costs are substantial and in which there is more than one valuable thing. This is true in the law of evidence as well. The rules of evidence do not have as their sole rationale ascertaining the truth. They reflect a concern for fairness and efficiency as well. Sometimes we prefer fairness to truth. Sometimes we prefer efficiency to truth. In the case of homosexual "marriage," the law prefers workability to strict justice. Rough justice is enough.

Kathryn Murphy, "Can the Budweiser Frogs Be Forced to Sing a New Tune? Compelled Commercial Counter-Speech and the First Amendment," Virginia Law Review 84 (September 1998): 1195.

Ken Saltman, "Men with Breasts," Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 25 (1998): 48.

Max Kolbel, "Lewis, Language, Lust and Lies," Inquiry 41 (September 1998): 301.

Michael Kober, "Kripkenstein Meets the Chinese Room: Looking for the Place of Meaning from a Natural Point of View," Inquiry 41 (September 1998): 317.

Robert Black, "Chance, Credence, and the Principal Principle," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (September 1998): 371.

Elegy, n. A composition in verse, in which, without employing any of the methods of humor, the writer aims to produce in the reader's mind the dampest kind of dejection. The most famous English example begins somewhat like this:

The cur foretells the knell of parting day;
The loafing herd winds slowly o'er the lea;
The wise man homeward plods; I only stay
To fiddle-faddle in a minor key.

Peg Kaplan has been blogging up a storm. She has several posts about the Lawrence Summers kerfuffle. See here. (I had to use "kerfuffle" at least once in this blog. Take a good look at it, because you may never see it again.)

If you've driven into Texas from the northeast, chances are you drove through Texarkana. Actually, there are two Texarkanas: one in Texas and one in neighboring Arkansas. I don't think there's one in Louisiana, but there should be.

I just created a blog for my department. See here. My colleagues have been invited to join. I hope they do. Our students will be able to comment on our posts and stay abreast of developments.

This is hilarious.

The following letter appeared in today's New York Times:

To the Editor:

Re "Harvard President Apologizes Again for Remarks on Gender" (news article, Jan. 20):

When Lawrence H. Summers, the president of Harvard University, suggested that women's underrepresentation in science may be attributed to innate factors related to gender, he created a "teachable moment" for greater public awareness of the need to advance women in science.

Considerable research and experience refute the notion that the status quo for women in science is natural, inevitable and unrelated to social factors. Research also shows that expectations heavily influence learning and performance.

If society and individuals anticipate that women will not perform as well as men, there is a good chance that those expectations will be met.

We must continue to address the many ways people are discouraged from pursuing an interest in science and engineering. Society benefits most when we take full advantage of all the talent among us.

It is time to create a broader awareness that enables women and other underrepresented groups to step beyond historical barriers in science and engineering.

Carol B. Muller
Sally K. Ride
Palo Alto, Calif., Jan. 20, 2005

The writers are, respectively, chief executive of MentorNet, the E-Mentoring Network for Women in Engineering and Science; and a professor of space science, University of California, San Diego. The letter was also signed by 98 other academics and scientists.

1. Innate differences between the sexes are part of the explanation of disparities in certain occupations.

2. Innate differences between the sexes are the whole of the explanation of disparities in certain occupations.

To the Editor:

I do not understand the public outcry regarding Lawrence H. Summers's suggestion that innate differences between the sexes may explain why fewer women succeed in science and math careers.

Is Harvard, a bastion of excellence in higher education, not allowed to touch that question? I hope not.

For critical and free-thinking ideas to flourish, it needs to be addressed.

There is a procedure in evaluating hypotheses within the scientific method. If Mr. Summers's statement falls on its merits, it will be because it will be thoroughly investigated and then summarily rejected. This, in turn, will attract more women into the various scientific fields and foster a greater understanding.

Isn't that, after all, the point of science?

Tony McGovern
Broomfield, Colo., Jan. 20, 2005

To the Editor:

I am saddened that the president of Harvard is under attack for suggesting some possible causes for the relative scarcity of senior women in science. As a woman with a talent for science, I have a personal interest in understanding why I have met so few like me.

We have ample evidence that there are differences in the ways men's and women's brains process information and in the ways their bodies process medications. Why shouldn't science question whether some differences, unrelated to social conditioning, might make the genders more or less competent at science?

While the academic community may have faith that scientific talent is gender-neutral, some of us would still like to know the truth of the matter so that we may one day understand, predict and control it.

Elizabeth Bryson
San Diego, Jan. 20, 2005

The editors of The New York Times crack me up. Just as Socrates (as reported in Plato's Apology) disavowed appealing to the pity of his jurors while doing precisely that, the editors disavow criticism of President Bush while criticizing him. See here. The Old Gray Lady has become a laughingstock, and the sad thing is, her editors don't realize it.

I'm a noncognitivist about moral judgments. Their function is not to describe but to prescribe. Since prescriptions are neither true nor false, moral judgments are neither true nor false. This is not to say that morality is nonrational, for each of us must work out a coherent set of moral beliefs and try to integrate them into our lives. Logic—specifically, the law of noncontradiction—plays a crucial role in this process. Nor is rational persuasion impossible. Rational persuasion consists in showing one's interlocutor that he or she is committed to believing or valuing this because he or she believes or values that. Some philosophers fear that if moral judgments are neither true nor false, then morality becomes a nonrational activity. Nothing could be further from the truth.

I've often heard it said, by philosophers, that philosophy is the search for truth. If this is the case, and if moral judgments are either true or false, then there should be less evaluative scatter among philosophers than among nonphilosophers. But I don't see any evidence of this. In my experience, there is as much evaluative scatter among philosophers as among lawyers, doctors, engineers, journalists, or people generally. Compare two philosophers with similar training: Brian Leiter and me. Both of us have law degrees and both of us have Ph.D. degrees in philosophy from prominent institutions. Both of us teach and write philosophy. When I read Brian's blog, I shake my head in wonder, for his values are diametrically opposed to mine. This is not a slam on Brian. I'm just using him as an example. There are many others.

If values are objective and if philosophy (or philosophical argumentation) is a means to discover them, then there should be convergence on moral beliefs and values among philosophers. Shouldn't there at least be less divergence among philosophers? But again, I don't see it. If anything, there is more evaluative scatter among philosophers than among people generally! In normative ethical theory alone, there are deontologists and consequentialists; within the class of consequentialists there are partialists and impartialists; within the class of impartialists there are rule-utilitarians and act-utilitarians. In political philosophy, there are libertarians, utilitarians, welfare liberals, Marxists, anarchists, and conservatives. In philosophy of law, there are realists, positivists, pragmatists, and natural lawyers. I could go on, but you get the idea.

I hope nobody writes to me to say that it's logically possible for there to be objective values even though evaluative scatter is great. Of course it is. It's logically possible that I'm a brain in a vat and that you're a robot. What I'm concerned about is plausibility, not logical possibility. It's highly implausible, given the extent of evaluative scatter and the amount of time such scatter has existed, that there are objective values. There are two hypotheses:

1. There are objective values, but philosophers haven't figured out how to discover them, despite trying very hard for many centuries.

2. There are no objective values.

Fiddle, n. An instrument to tickle human ears by friction of a horse's tail on the entrails of a cat.

To Rome said Nero: "If to smoke you turn
I shall not cease to fiddle while you burn."
To Nero Rome replied: "Pray do your worst,
'Tis my excuse that you were fiddling first."
Orm Pludge.

The liberal mantra about abortion is "choice." It's said to be nobody's business but the woman's whether she carries her pregnancy to term or ends it by killing the fetus. But when it comes to other important matters, such as educating one's children and saving for one's retirement, liberals are opposed to choice. They oppose the use of school vouchers that would give parents a choice of where to educate their children. They oppose privatization of Social Security, thus forcing everyone to stay in a system that is going bankrupt.

Liberals don't really care about choice. First, they don't trust people to make good choices. Look at the rhetoric during and after the presidential election. To explain why President Bush was reelected, liberals say that the American people were ignorant (of relevant facts), stupid, or duped by devious Republicans. If only the American people would follow their more educated and intelligent betters, they would be fine. They would be cared for. Second, liberals are heavily invested in the public-school system and the Social Security system. Teachers are a Democrat constituency. My guess is that most of the bureaucrats in the Social Security Administration are Democrats, or at least liberals. So tinkering with these institutions jeopardizes Democrat electoral prospects. The Democrat deal is: "You vote for us; we'll take care of you."

In the case of abortion, the relevant constituencies are feminists and those who benefit from legal abortion by providing "abortion services." Giving women the "choice" to kill their fetuses keeps a lot of people working and keeps the money coming in to feminist coffers (largely through fear-mongering). Perhaps I'm cynical, but I don't see liberals as principled defenders of individual choice. I see them as defenders of turf. They're motivated by self-interest, not altruism.

Here is Paul Krugman's latest rant. What I don't understand is why he's opposed to giving individuals a choice about how to invest for their retirement. It's my understanding that nobody would be forced to opt out of Social Security. What Krugman wants to do is force people to stay in.

For someone with a Ph.D. degree, Andrew Sullivan sure is stupid. A minute ago, on Scarborough Country, he said that President Bush is inconsistent for seeking to expand liberty abroad while contracting it at home. His example of contracting liberty at home? Opposing homosexual "marriage." That has nothing to do with liberty. If President Bush advocated punishment of those who engage in homosexual sodomy (fellatio, cunnilingus, or buggery), Sullivan would have a point. But to my knowledge, President Bush has never advocated that. What he advocates is limiting marriage to those who can benefit from it.

Thank you, Steven Pinker, for bringing some sanity to the discussion of Lawrence Summers's remarks. See here. (Thanks to The Volokh Conspiracy for the link.)

Can you say "sore loser"? See here.

See here for Carol's take on President Bush's inaugural address. Amen.

My friend Bill Keezer has posted some reflections on diet. See here.

Like Dave Barry, Jeff makes me laugh. See here.

Law professor Gail Heriot, who blogs at The Right Coast, has been writing about homosexual "marriage." See here.

To the Editor:

After reading all the prevarications, half-truths and rationalizations offered by Condoleezza Rice about our invasion of Iraq ("Rice's Day: Sharp Views of Senators, and Nominee's Replies, Focusing on the War," excerpts from testimony, Jan. 19), I turned the page to see the true face of the Iraq war revealed.

There it was in your photograph, a small child with blood-stained face and hands, screaming because her parents had just been killed by American troops when their car failed to stop as directed.

I stared at this little girl's picture for a long time and wondered how Ms. Rice might explain to her, someday, why she had been forced to live life without a mother or a father because of a "strategic" decision to topple Saddam Hussein.

Indeed, what words of comfort or justification could ever be spoken to the countless thousands of Iraqis who have lost parents, brothers and sisters in the violence spawned by this senseless war, or to the relatives of our own countrymen and women whose lives have been tragically wasted? I could think of none.

Rather, as an American for whom this war violates every principle I believe once made our nation great, I was overcome with a deep and unremitting sense of shame.

Joseph J. Saltarelli
New York, Jan. 19, 2005

Here, in case you missed it, is the text of President Bush's inaugural address.

This is the springtime of my loving—
the second season I am to know
You are the sunlight in my growing—
so little warmth I felt before.
It isn't hard to feel me glowing—
I watched the fire that grew so low.
It is the summer of my smiles—
flee from me Keepers of the Gloom.
Speak to me only with your eyes
it is to you I give this tune.
It isn't hard to recognise—
these things are clear to all from
time to time.

Talk Talk—
I felt the coldness of my winter
I never thought it would ever go
I cursed the gloom that set upon us
but I know that I love you so
but I know that I love you so.

These are the seasons of emotion
And like the winds they rise and fall
This is the wonder of devotion—
I see the torch we all must hold.
This is the mystery of the quotient—
Upon us all a little rain
must fall.

Coronation, n. The ceremony of investing a sovereign with the outward and visible signs of his divine right to be blown skyhigh with a dynamite bomb.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

This just in: A federal district judge in Florida upheld the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) against a constitutional challenge. See here. The case will be appealed. If the United States Supreme Court affirms the district judge's ruling, there will be no need for a constitutional amendment to prohibit homosexual "marriage." If the Court reverses, there will. I am confident that homosexual "marriage" will not be forced on the citizens of any state. I am even confident that the citizens of Massachusetts will amend their constitution to undo the damage done by their Supreme Judicial Court. These are exciting times.

If you've been following the controversy about Harvard president Lawrence Summers (see here), read this essay by Robert Wright. It's a PDF file. Scroll to page 51 to begin reading.

I have three vices (if you don't count blogging): swearing, chewing toothpicks, and drinking coffee. I've never smoked, and I drank alcohol for only three years in my youth (mid-1974 to early 1978). I drink two cups of coffee every morning. It perks me up. I used to drink a cup of instant coffee in the afternoon, but recently I switched to tea. There are many deliciously flavored teas on the market. Right now I have four kinds: Celestial Seasonings Cinnamon Apple Spice; Bigelow Orange & Spice; Celestial Seasonings True Blueberry; and Lipton Raspberry. All are caffeine free and soothing.

Count me among those who object to the extravagance of the presidential inauguration. I don't care whether the money comes from private sources. This is my government. Celebrations should be kept to a minimum. If the Bush family wants to expend its resources on a private party in Kennebunkport or Crawford, so be it; but keep the government out of it. I'm not saying that the money should be used for other purposes (such as tsunami relief). Nor am I concerned (much) about the awkward symbolism of celebrating while American soldiers are dying in Iraq. I'm an Epicurean. I value frugality in my own life and in my government.

It is certainly unjust arbitrarily to deny legal marriage to persons who are capable of performing marital acts and entering into the marital relationship. So, for example, laws forbidding interracial marriages truly were violations of equality. Contrary to the published claims of Andrew Sullivan, Andrew Koppelman, and others, however, laws that embody the judgment that marriage is intrinsically heterosexual are in no way analogous to laws against miscegenation. Laws forbidding whites to marry blacks were unjust, not because they embodied a particular moral view and thus violated the alleged requirement of moral neutrality; rather, they were unjust because they embodied an unsound (indeed a grotesquely false) moral view—one that was racist and, as such, immoral.

(Robert P. George, The Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion, and Morality in Crisis [Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2001], 89)

To the Editor:

Re "Laura Bush Defends Gala in Time of War and Disaster" (news article, Jan. 15):

While I agree with the first lady's assertion